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NOTES
THE EXA31INATION OF TITLES IN KENTUCKY*
This paper is a discussion of something of purely practical
value, the Examination of Real Estate Titles. It is a type of
work largely committed to the younger man who goes into the
larger offices, where the result of his work will probably have
the final once-over of the older and more experienced members
of the firm; and he naturally will desire that his work will
be good. If there were some concrete written law upon the
subject, this discussion would not be worthwhile; but unhappily
there is no such well from which one may draw the pure fluid
of perfection. The statutes are multiform. The decisions of
the courts are not the less numerous. Only from years of
experience can one hope to kiiow, in an intuitive sort of way),
the main stream of a perfect title, and the feeder streams that
go to make up the main current.
Real estate titles may evolute from certain primary sources
which may be here mentioned, and which in turn will be con-
sidered as upon their main features. They are: By deed; by
inheritance, or to be more exact, by the Kentucky Statutes of
Descent and Distribution which may, in a generic sort of way,
be said to direct the course of inheritance; by will; by adverse
possession.
Then I purpose to discuss the indirect impinging of sundry
side channels upon all four titular methods.
1. TITLE By CoNvEnANcn INTE Vivos
Upon this nature of titular acquisition we may rest with a
good deal of primary, but not final, confidence upon the Statutes
-provided, and the proviso is large, that we may be sure that
our search: of the index has brought us to know and consider All
the statutory law, the latent as well as thepatent. So we may
very well go into the form of the deed itself, and the manner of
its formal execution and recordation:
* This article was not prepared by Judge Winn for publication,
but was the basis of an oral discussion.
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(a) Section 501 of the Statutes provides for the acknowl-
edgment in Kentucky before notaries public, or the Clerk of a
County Court, or (and this anomalous method is not recom-
mended) by the proof of two subscribing witnesses, somewhat
after the manner of the execution and attestation of wills. No
seal is required of the Kentucky officer.
(b) If the document be executed outside of the state, and
within the confines of any of the states or territories, the execu-
tion may be before the Clerk of a Court, a notary public, mayor
of a city, or Commissioner of Deeds, all under seal.'
(c) Section 503 of the Statutes provides for the execution
of deeds in extraterritorial lands. It is not necessary to go into
it here.
After the deed has thus been rightfully acknowledged by
the grantor and delivered to the grantee, it is perfectly good as
between them; but its sufficiency as against others is another
story. The grantee, to protect himself, must forthwith place it
on record in the County Clerk's office, in the county where the
land lies. When once so recorded, it is constructive knowledge
to all the world of everything in it. That is the intent of section
494 of the Statutes. But, and note this carefully, it is not good
to protect the grantee if he had prior actual knowledge of any
adverse transaction affecting the grantor's title-a provision
written into the very wording of the named statute.
Certain other essential matters may be the subject of brief
allusion:
(a) A married man in Kentucky, without joint execution
by his wife, may make a valid conveyance of his real estate.
His grant is good and perfect-but if the grantor's wife has
not joined in the deed, she, upon his death, will be entitled to
her dower of one-third in the land for the term of her natural
life.
(b) Per cantra, a married woman cannot, in Kentucky,
make any conveyance of, or create any lien upon, her lands
unless her husband join with her as a co-grantor or co-lienor,
followed by due execution and acknowledgment. That distinc-
tion between the freedom of the husband and wife to convey
found in sections 2127 and following of the Statutes is about
Ky. Stat. (Carroll's, 1936), § 503.
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all that is left in Kentucky differentiating the equal rights in
property and ownership as between married men and married
women.
(c) Under section 490 of the Statutes an "owner may
convey any interest in lands not in the adverse possession of
another." Now that sounds plain enough, but there is a false-
hood in the very simplicity of its statement; for there are cer-
tain interests in lands which the owner cannot convey. We
have a sort of an inherent sense that one who takes a grant of
land, or who becomes the beneficiary of a gift of it under a will,
may do with it as he pleases, may, as within the words of thd
statute, "convey any interest in lands"; but let us see about
that: there has grown up in Kentucky, as in other states, the
doctrine of a limited restraint against alienation by the owner
of lands. It is a quixotic rule; and yet it is firmly implanted
in the judicial statutes (a misnomer, of course) of the Common-
wealth. Perhaps my meaning may best be expressed by refer-
ence to certain particular cases. To illustrate,
Harkness v. Lisle:2 Here the Court wrote that it is "com-
mitted to the doctrine that a restraint on alienation for a reason-
able time is valid." So if the grantor or the testator should
pass land to a vendee or devisee, and in the instrument thus
passing the title should prohibit the taker from selling the land
for a reasonable length of time (note the word "reasonable"),
the taker could not, notwithstanding the direct intent of the
statute quoted above, pass a good title to another. To those
interested in a further investigation of the subject, mention
may be made of Stewart v. Brady3 and Stewart v. Barrow4 as
they have been discussed and enlarged upon in subsequent Ken-
tucky cases citing them. It is enough to say of them here and
now that they commit the law of Kentucky to the doctrine that
one who takes title by what would otherwise be a fee simple
may not pass that title on as against a restriction that he may
not convey it away within a reasonable time. Just what is a
reasonable time ? The kind gods alone, and the judges of the
Court of Appeals, may know. A restriction for the lifetime of
the taker has been held invalid in Cropper v. Bowlts5  A re-
2132 Ky. 767, 117 S. W. 352 (1909).
866 Ky. (3 Bush) 623 (1868).
'70 Ky. (7 Bush) 368 (1870).
'150 Ky. 393, 150 S. W. 380 (1912).
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straint against alienation by the grantee during the lifetime of
the grantor has been upheld in Turner v. LewisO-and this not-
withstanding that the lifetime of the grantor may, in the course
of things, chance far to outrun the lifetime of the grantee, whose
lifetime may not be the subject of a reasonable restraint. So, as
in Harkness v. Lisle7 it was held that a provision against aliena-
tion to a certain specified person was valid. So, also, in Price v.
Virginia Iron, Coal and Coke Co.8 it was held that a provision
that the grantee should not for a period of twenty years convey
the land to any person other than the grantee's bodily heirs was
reasonable and valid. There are many other cases which could
be examined to advantage, and which should be examined,
whenever the title searcher meets, in a source of title, any effort
at restraint upon free and full alienation. Out of the welter of
cases, unless they fell upon the one extreme or the other, an
exact determination is in the lap of the gods, if the searohel'
takes the chance; and upon that subject of taking the chance,
it may parenthetically be remarked that there is always the
open sesame of a friendly judicial determination of whether
the restraint be valid or invalid.
(d) Contrary to the common understanding, an infant's
deed is not void.9 It is voidable, it is true, upon the infant
grantor's part, but not upon that of the adult grantee under an
infant's deed. But if the infant, apparently mature, repre-
sents to the grantee that he is of full age, his representation
estops him from attacking his deed upon the ground of his
minority.' 0
(e) Insane persons may convey; but their deeds are void-
able if there be inadequacy of price, or other injustice in thd
obtention of the deed. And their deeds are not ipso facto void-
able, where the transactions are fair."
(f) A deed of pure quitclaim, purporting to do no more
than is evidenced in the term itself, is good to pass title.12
189 Ky. 837, 226 S. W. 367 (1920).
Supra, note 2.
'171 Ky. 523, 188 S. W. 658 (1916).
* See the West Ky. Digest, Title "Infants", Section 23.
See Adkins v. Adkins, 183 Ky. 662, 210 S. W. 462 (1919).
' Clay v. Clay's Committee, 179 Ky. 494, 200 S. W. 934 (1918);
Lexington & Eastern Ry. Co. v. Napier's Heirs, 160 Ky. 579, 169 S. W.
1017 (1914)
1 Smith v. Graf, 259 Ky. 456, 82 S. W. (2d) 461 (1935).
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(g) To be effectual as a grant, the grantor must be named
in the text itself; if he merely sign and acknowledge a deed in
which he is not named as a grantor, his act is wholly ineffectual.
13
(h) In 1904 the General Assembly enacted a statute requir-
ing every grant of land to recite in its text the source of the
grantor's title, and to give where it was of record, the date of the
instrument affording his title, and the book and page of its
record. That provision will be found of most excellent value to
the title searcher. But it is to be borne in mind that, though the
statute is peremptory in its such demand, the failure of the
grantor to insert his source does not make the deed ineffective
to pass his title.'14
In What has been said about the formalities of deeds, the
writer indulges the hope that the surface has been rather more
than scratched; but be very, very sure not to rely upon it as a
plowing of the large and wide field. It is my belief that if these
narrowly stated fundamentals are kept in mind, and if the stat-
utes and cases cited are gone into, the searcher will be stimulated
from the very investigation thus required to follow up to their
sources other minor channels not made the subject of specific
allusion.
2. TITLE BY INHERITANCE
Expanding a reflection heretofore adverted to, it is stated
that there is, in Kentucky, no such thing as the taking of real
property by inheritance, as that term is commonly understood.
The use of the word "heir" in Kentucky is a misnomer; but
we cannot abandon its use, because we have no concrete and
succinct term to describe the passage of lands where there is no
will. The term, "descent and distribution" is too long and
unwieldy, so I follow the common parlance, and speak of, one
who takes under these statutes as an heir.
The devolution of the real property of an intestate is set
up in Kentucky in sections 1393 and following of the Kentucky
Statutes. I make brief condensation of them; but it is always
to be borne in mind that statutory provisions are ephemeral,
and that the course of descent and distribution of today may be
altered by legislative enactment tomorrow.
'3Parsons v. Justice, 163 Ky. 737, 174 S. W. 725 (1915).
"-Perkins v. J. M. Robinson Norton & Co., 124 S. W. 310.
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The titular searcher then, in his effort to determine whether
the grantors have passed, or the proposed grantor is enabled to
pass, a good title, must take fair and full concern of these stat-
utes. If it be an executed conveyance to which the searcher's
attention is addressed, he will find that since 1928 there has
existed in Kentucky a statute' 5 demanding that the grant of one
who takes by inheritance shall have filed with it an affidavit of
descent setting forth that state of facts which makes of him a
good grantor. Back of that time, the searcher's only reliance
was upon known family history; and the title abstractors of
whom precision was demanded had to go about among the older
inhabitants, and get from them affidavits that A and B and C, to
illustrate, were the only surviving descendants of the intestate
D; or that E married F, and was without issue; or that G, who
may have conveyed forty or fifty years ago, was unmarried at
the time, and was of full age. These are considerations which
the title examiner, going back the essential period of years, must
yet take into consideration. In the rural communities, there will
not be much of difficulty, but in the cities, where neighbor knows
less of neighbor, and where there is a constant flux and flow -of
population, it may be difficult to ascertain the facts-but until
these family facts are known, and are duly ascertained by the
searcher, he is without right to say that the title is good.
A few of the provisions of the statutes of descent and dis-
tribution may have cursory allusion:
(a) If either consort die, leaving the other surviving,
with children of their union, we all rather inherently under-
stand that the surviving consort takes one-third of the realty
for life, and that the descendants of the union, per stirpes, take
the fee, subject to this life right of one-third. But not all of
us may understand that if there be no heirs, and there
be a surviving consort, such survivor takes the entirety.
The devolution beyond that will be found set out in 1393 of the
Kentucky Statutes.
(b) If the property goes to collateral kindred by virtue of
the absence of descendants, and a surviving consort, the col-
laterals of the half blood, half brothers, half nieces, and the
like, take only half as much as those of whole blood. 16
2S Ky. Stat. (Carroll's, 1936), § 4095a-1.
'Ky. Stat., § 1395.
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(c) A bastard may inherit from his mother, but not from
his father; and he may transmit through his intestate death
property to his mother, or her kindred, and not to his father.17
(d) An illegitimate child becomes legitimate for purposes
of inheritance if his parents, after his birth, marry and recognize
him.18
(e) Then here are two peculiar and particular exceptions
to the statutes:
If a parent shall have made a gift of real estate to his son,
and if that son die intestate, and without issue, the identical
property will revert to the grantor parent, if living.' 9
(f) If an infant die without issue, having theretofore
derived real estate title from either of his parents, the parent,
if living, and, if not, his or her kindred, inherit the entirety of
such estate.
A retention in mind of these elementary statements will, it is
believed, suffice to set the searcher of the records so far into the
right channels as that he is not apt to go ashore.
3. TITLE BY WiLs
The subject of Will Construction, and of the sundry rules
by which are fixed the nature of estates created by them, are too
ramified to be set forth in this brief discussion. *When, in the
course of titular search, there appear in the chain of title gifts
to testator's "heirs", or "children", there must be studious
examination of the case law to ascertain the identity of the
takers. To illustrate: is the word "heirs" synonymous with
"children"? Does the word "children" mean John, and James,
and Mary, who actually are children, or does it extend to include
descendants of children who may be dead! To what date or
time are to be related the words "dying without issue'"-do they
mean the time of the death of the testator, or that of a prioi
life-tenant, or the childless death of the devisee at any time
whatsoever? No succinct answer can be given here; and this
because the provisions in the sundry wills employing these terms
are about as uncertain as the poor vehicle of phraseology may
27Ky. Stat,§ 1397.
UKy. Stat, § 1398
2 3Ky. Stat., § 1400.
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make them. Safety may be found only in a studious search
of the allied cases upon the subject. There are, however, cer-
tain fundamentals which can be stated with reasonable certi-
tude:
(a) The orders of probate should be looked to, naturally,
to see whether the will has been duly established and recorded
as a valid will. Its probate is declared by Section 4852 of the
Statutes to be conclusive, if probated in the proper county, until
it may be "superseded, reversed, or annulled."
(b) After probate, and after the elapsing of twelve
months, a purchaser may buy of a devisee, without liability to
the creditors of the estate.20  But, if an appeal be taken within
12 months after probate, the Circuit Court may make an order
restraining any distribution pending the appeal.2 1 But pend-
ing a contested original probate proceeding, a personal repre-
sentative, though duly empowered otherwise, can not sell the
land of the deceased.2 2
(c) Every person of sound mind, and over the age of 21
may make a will.23 This particular statute, coming down from
ancient days, as well excludes married women; but by an act of
1894,24 a married woman may now make a will.
(d) But this must be looked to, and borne in mind: if a
man or woman make a will, and thereafter marry, the docu-
ment becomes null.25 The statute seems rather nonsensical,
since either surviving spouse would have the right to renounce
the will,2 6 and take his or her distributable and dower portions.
(e) Suppose a testator dispose by will of a particular
piece of realty, and then, before his death, shall have sold the
realty, what is the rule? The sale, of course, stands; and under
Sec. 4835 of the Statutes, it does not affect the other provisions
of the will. But there is another statute, See. 2068, which bears
directly upon the subject here. That statute provides that if
the land be devised to an "heir" of the testator, the value of
-Ky. Stat., § 2087
0 Ky. Stat., § 4851
"Ky. Stat., § 3848
=KY. Stat., § 4825
A' Ky. Stat., § 2147.
"Ky. Stat., § 4832
-Ky. Stat., § 1304.
X. L. J.-6
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the devise, which otherwise would have been frustrated by the
sale, shall go to the heir. Qu~ere: Would not land bought with
such proceeds pass under the will-though not owned at the
time of the will's making?
(f) If a devisee is dead when the will-maker dies, the issue
of the devisee will take the land.21
(g) But if there be no such issue, or if for any other
reason whatsoever any devise in a will should fail or be void,
the property included in such devise does not pass under the
residuary clause of the will, but passes as intestate property.28
(h) If a testator has a child whom he does not mention in
his will, such child shall take his fractional portion of the
estate.29  And just here it is well to recall this interesting rule:
a testator can not exclude his child by a plain provision that
this child shall take no part of the estate; for he must go further,
and give all his estate to others-or the child, notwithstanding
the prohibition, will take his share of any undevised estate. 30
(i) The will of a non-resident may be probated in Ken-
tucky, and will suffice to pass title to Kentucky land, when, and
only when, it shall have been executed according to Kentucky's
rules of execution.3 1
(j) I do not go into them, but make reference to, the im-
portant statutes on will construction embraced within Sections
2338, and following. The sections deal with those elusive sub-
jects of "death without issue", contingent remainders, and the
like. Nothing less than everlasting zeal in searching out these
statutes and the case law can put one upon sound footing. But
there is this one point that should be mentioned. If a land
owner acquires his title under a document, either granting or
testamentary in character, with an integral provision for a
defeasance, as in case (to illustrate) he should die without issue,
and he should so die, his widow takes her dower in the land,
notwithstanding that the interest or estate of her husband
terminated with his death. 32 The rule is well settled, though
'Ky. Stat., § 4841.
Ky. Stat., § 4843.
"Ky. Stat., § 4848.
Owsley v. Gilbert, 262 Ky. 798, 91 S. W. (2d) 513 (1936).
-Ky. Stat., § 4854.
2See Rice v. Rice, 133 Ky. 406, 118 S. W. 270 (1909); Landers
v. Landers, 151 Ky. 206, 151 S. W. 386 (1912); Murphy v. Murphy,
182 Ky. 731, 207 S. W. 491 (1919).
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its artificiality is apparent; for it is patently inconsistent that
the widow of one who takes a life estate should not have dower,
and yet that the widow of one who has a defeasible estate, which
is reduced to a life tenure by his death without issue, should
have dower.
Finally, upon this subject: the writer has not endeavored
to cover the somewhat multiform other questions that are sure
to arise. But what has been said should so far suffice to arouse
a comprehension of the dangers inherent in will titles, and to
arouse a sense of the necessity of full investigation of the statu-
tory and case law, that it will at least be of service.
4. TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION
1st. Title by adverse possession means fundamentally such
possession consistently and continuously for fifteen years.
There then intervenes Section 2505 of the Statutes, which for-
bids the bringing of an action to recover real estate within
fifteen years from the time when the cause of action first
accrued. So the right of action accrues at any time during the
currency of the fifteen years; but when the fifteen years are
ended, without action by the adverse claimant, he is barred by
the statute.
Inasmuch as claims of ownership through adverse possession
are rare in the lowlands and cities of the Commonwealth, but
are much more generally common in the hill country of the state,
I do not go into them with much of detail.
2nd. What is adverse possession.? Answer: in the first
place, it means possession in the essential intent of such a title.
A claimant by adverse possession need not be on the land him-
self; for he can occupy it by a tenant or a lessee. He may pos-
sess it upon an enclosure and the use of it for the requisite time,
without any actual residence upon it. The requisites of an
adverse possession are best set out, so far as I have ever been
able to find, in the Kentucky case law, in Owsley v. Owstey"3
in these words:
"It must be an actual physical entry upon or control of the prem-
Ises, and be continuous."
"It must be open, that is, It must of itself be such as to afford
notice to the rightful owner of its hostile nature."
- 117 Ky. 47, 77 S. W. 397 (1903).
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"It must be adverse, that is, it must be against and in defiance of
the claim of the real title holder, and be such as to exclude his
authority."
"It must be accompanied by the claim by the occupant that It Is
his property, either by speech or by such acts of authority as indicate
It"
It would be hard to improve upon these fundamentals.
There are naturally other impinging propositions, such as the
area or the extent of the possession, answered by the two rules
that if one enter without a paper title, but just as a squatter,
and takes possession, his possession is limited to that indicated
by well-defined and marked boundaries, and the other of them
that if he enters under a written claim of title, his possessioxo
will be coextensive with the lines of his paper title. Then, of
course, there is always the question of what is continuity, upon
which the thought may be remarked that occasional acts, such
as cutting timber or plowing a field for certain seasons, will not
suffice-for the demand is for continuity. And continuity is
not broken during the moving out of one tenant under the
adverse claimant and the present moving in of another; but
bad luck to him if he lets it lie there any perceptible time
unoccupied, or not used. From the nature of the word it must be
adverse, i. e., if one go in as the tenant of another, his entry is
friendly and not adverse; and in order to set up adverse title
claim in himself, he must bring home notice to the one under
whom he enters that he renounces allegiance to him, and asserts
possession in himself. And he cannot act silently or secretly;
for, as within the definition above given, he must proclaim his
claim on the highways and by-ways, or by his equally effective
acts of occupancy and use.
There is this one important addition to this subject:
There are, of course, no record titles of adverse possession.
There is no central office to which the searcher may go to ascer-
tain whether the claimant has perfected his title. As a general
proposition, the purchase of adverse titles means the purchase
of conflicting and generally litigated claims of ownership.
There, of course, may be instances when the buyer and his lawyer
feel so far convinced of the efficiacy of the possession as to per-
suade them to take such title; but in the main such a course is
of more than doubtful wisdom. Knowledge about these claimed
titles will largely come not as incident to titular investigation
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as preliminary to bargain and sale, but as incident to the prose-
cution or defense of law suits in which the subject of adverse
possession is the test of success or failure in the claim.
5. TiTLx BY SUNDRy HIDDEN OR INDMECT LImNs
There are created by statute, state and Federal, certain
liens upon realty which may be described generally as involun-
tary, as distinguished from those which the title holder may
himself have created by mortgage or purchase money lien.
There are a good many of them, such as liens upon railroad
properties, and the like, which are unnecessary, perhaps, to dis-
cuss here. There are, however, certain ones, the possibility of
the existence of which should be borne in mind always, and
which should be searched out in the effort to ascertain a clear
title. These may be named:
(a) By section 1560 of Title 26 of the U. S. Code Anno--
tated, there is created a lien in favor of the United States for
all Federal taxes unpaid after demand "upon all property
* * * whether real or personal, belonging to such person".
The Federal Government must, under the demands of section
1562 of the same book, give notice of this lien, which it may do
in either of two ways:
1st. It may file notice of the lien in the office of the Clerk
of the United States District Court in the district where the
property lies-which necessitates an examination of the records
in that office where there may be any sort of occasion to suspect
the possibility of unpaid Federal taxes.
2nd. The same statute provides that the notice may be
given as well by filing notice of the lien in the office of the Clerk
of the County in which the property lies, a provision which is
made possible by section 2358a-2 of the Kentucky Statutes.
(b) Under the state law, one who furnishes material or
labor in the improvement of real estate has a lien upon the
property alike for the material or the wages, or both. The one
who becomes the beneficiary of such right to a lien must, under
the provisions of section 2463 of the Statutes, file his notice
before the beginning of the work, or the furnishing of any
material, or, under the provisions of section 2468, he may file
his lien within six months after the material is furnished, or the
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work is done. Thus, for six months, there may exist a lien
wholly in the air, of which there is, and for which there need.
be, no sort of record manifestation or assertion; and if the sale
be of newly improved property, the utmost caution should be
observed to see that the bills against it for labor and materials
are paid.
(c), Under the several statutes appertaining to the several
statutory classes of towns in Kentucky, streets may be improved
as an expense charged against the property abutting upon the
streets. These statutes generally provide for liens against the
abutting properties; so if the property being dealt with abuts
upon any such street improvement, the existence of such a lien
must be made the subject of inquiry.
(d) If a suit be brought either in the state or Federal
District Court which affects the title to or a lien upon any real
estate, the plaintiff in this action may, under the provisions of
section 2358a-1, file in the County Clerk's office a notice of the
existence of the action; and after the filing of such notice a
buyer of the property takes it subject to any rights which the
plaintiff in the suit may gain in or against the property. There
is kept in each County Clerk's office a book of these involuntary
liens and judicial liens, and a squint must be had at it.
(e) When a sheriff gives a bond for the faithful perform-
ance of his duties, the statutory law of the Commonwealth, sec-
tion 4130, fastens a lien upon his real estate as additional
surety; and if the property under investigation belong to, or
has in any comparatively recent past year belonged to, a sheriff,
it must be seen whether he has received his quietus.
(f) I recur again to the provisions of section 2087 of the
Statutes, which in effect gives a lien upon the property of a
decedent for a period of twelve months after his death-gives
it in the indirect way of a provision that an alienation by the
heir or devisee within this time shall not be effective against
creditors of the decedent who, within this time, may bring their
actions.
ROBERT H. WINx,
Attorney at Law,
Mt. Sterling, Ky.
